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Thomas C. Baxter, Jr.
On October 25, 2002, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., General Counsel and Executive Vice President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, presented the following remarks at the Puerto Rico
Bankers Association conference “Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance of Financial
Institutions after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
T
oday’s conference is devoted to financial trans-
parency and corporate governance,two related
but distinct topics.I commend the Association
for devoting time to these timely and important topics and
for giving me the opportunity to share my views. The
recent accounting scandals involving some well-regarded
U.S.firms are a sharp reminder of what can happen when
corporate governance is neglected.In a speech earlier this
month,Comptroller of the Currency John D.Hawke,Jr.,
observed that this series of scandals might serve as a pow-
erful catalyst for constructive change.1 I agree with the
comptroller’s observation and believe that the way we
respond to corporate misconduct today will make for a
stronger business and financial community tomorrow.
My remarks will focus on the governance of a financial
or bank holding company and,specifically,the relationship
between the holding company and an insured depository
institution subsidiary.For ease of reference,I will refer to
the financial or bank holding company as the “holding
company” and its insured depository institution sub-
sidiary as the “bank.”
I begin with a preliminary statement about a shared
objective:We want the governing body of the holding com-
pany to perform two critical functions.First,we want it to
understand the risks to the “enterprise,”meaning the risks
in all of the company’s constituent parts.Second,we want
the holding company to take reasonable steps to manage
those risks and keep them within acceptable limits.
By “we,”I mean those persons who might be described
as having a stake in the success or failure of the enter-
prise.These stakeholders include the holding company’s
shareholders,to be sure.In addition,when there is a bank
in a corporate family,the government also has a prime
interest.
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For lawyers,the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,which was signed into
law on July 30,2002,was a watershed event.The act has sig-
nificant implications for publicly traded companies,the people who
govern those companies,company auditors and attorneys,and
analysts and investment banks.Many of the speakers today
will explain why this is so.The act is important not only for its
content but also for its symbolism; it has placed corporate
governance at the top of current policy issues.
Interestingly,many of the remedial provisions of the act
are not completely new to bankers and bank counsel.In fact,
bankers have told me informally that their institutions will
not need to make substantial changes to satisfy some of the
provisions because they have been complying with similar
provisions for years.
Let me give you two specific examples.In 1991,in the wake
of a series of insured depository institution failures,Congress
enacted legislation known as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act, or FDICIA. Section 36 of
FDICIA is titled “Early Identification of Needed Improvements
in Financial Management.”2 Isn’t it telling how well this
decade-old title fits the problems we have seen in nonbank
companies during the last several months? Section 36 and 
the regulation that implements it—Title 12,Part 363,of the
Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)—require each insured 
depository institution to prepare a report,to be signed by the
chief executive officer and the chief accounting officer,
acknowledging management’s responsibilities for the annual
financial statements, for establishing and maintaining an 
adequate internal control structure and procedures for finan-
cial reporting,and for complying with laws and regulations
relating to safety and soundness.3Another requirement is an
assessment by management of the effectiveness of the insured
depository institution’s internal control structure and proce-
dures,and of the institution’s compliance with such laws and
regulations.4 Bankers have been complying with Section 36
and Part 363 for ten years.
The certification provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
clearly draw on the FDICIA rules.Like FDICIA,the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act requires, among other things, that the principal
executive officer and the principal financial officer acknowl-
edge in each annual or quarterly report their responsibility for
internal controls and present their conclusions as to the effec-
tiveness of those internal controls.To be sure,the certification
required by Sarbanes-Oxley is more robust than that man-
dated by FDICIA.While FDICIA requires that internal controls
be adequate,Sarbanes-Oxley requires that internal controls
ensure that information material to the company and its con-
solidated subsidiaries is made known to the appropriate offi-
cers.Sarbanes-Oxley also goes further than FDICIA in detail-
ing the kind of information that must be included in reports
concerning the effectiveness of controls and procedures.
In one area,however,FDICIA appears to be more exacting
than Sarbanes-Oxley—its stipulation that management
acknowledge responsibility for complying with laws and
regulations relating to safety and soundness.5 The fact that
legal compliance certification exists in FDICIA but not in
Sarbanes-Oxley is very significant:It is emblematic of a view
that banks are different from other types of firms,and that
the government has an interest in banks.Compliance with
law and regulation is necessary to protect the government’s
interest.Still,despite these differences between Sarbanes-
Oxley and FDICIA, it is apparent that the certification
requirements in the 2002 act are conceptually very similar to
those in the earlier banking legislation.
Another provision within Sarbanes-Oxley that has its
roots in preexisting banking law is Section 402 of the act.
Section 402 makes it unlawful for an issuer to extend or
maintain credit,or arrange for the extension or renewal of an
extension of credit,to any director or executive officer of the
issuer.I think nearly every banker and bank lawyer is mind-
ful of the insider lending provisions of Section 22(h) of the
Federal Reserve Act and its implementing regulation,
Regulation O. These provisions address the problem of
insider abuse in a banking organization, and they have
existed in banking regulation for many years.The drafters of
the act clearly had these prudential legal provisions in mind,
because the prohibition in the act does not apply if the issuer
is an insured depository institution.Instead,the provisions
of Section 22(h) and Regulation O apply.
Corporate Governance in Banks and Holding
Companies after Sarbanes-Oxley
I assume by now you are willing to accept my proposition
that many of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have their
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genesis in banking law. How does all of this relate to my
topic, which looks to the governance of the holding com-
pany? The short answer is that prudential banking laws and
regulations,at least as they relate to safety and soundness,
were designed to safeguard the government’s interest in the
bank.Sarbanes-Oxley picks up some of those principles and
employs them to protect the stakeholders interested in pub-
licly traded companies,including the company shareholders.
Of course,because many of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions
are safety and soundness provisions,they extend a safety net
to other persons interested in issuer safety,such as creditors
and employees,and even retirees whose 401(k) plans include
stock in the bank or holding company.
The act and its implementing regulations will likely apply
to the holding company,assuming that it is publicly traded.
The applicability of Sarbanes-Oxley to foreign companies is
complicated,and many of the foreign institutions here will
need to work closely with counsel.Of course,FDICIA and
Part 363 will continue to apply to the wholly owned bank.In
addition,the holding company will likely be subject to mea-
sures being adopted by the New York Stock Exchange,the
American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ. Finally, there are
fiduciary obligations imposed on the board of directors and
the audit committee by the law of the place where the hold-
ing company is incorporated.If the bank has a state charter,
state law may also impose requirements on the board of
directors or the audit committee.
How can all of this legal infrastructure relating to the
governance of a holding company be reconciled? Let me
offer you some principles that might be of practical utility.I
must caution you,however,that compliance with the letter
of the law will always turn on the unique facts presented.
Banks and the Importance of Holding
Company Control
In his recent speech about governance,Comptroller Hawke
observed that “banking organizations are different.”While I
agree with the comptroller,I believe that E.Gerald Corrigan,
former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
said it even better.In his words,“banks are special.”6
Mr. Corrigan offered two distinct reasons why banks are
special.First,unlike other corporate entities,banks have spe-
cial access to the credit facilities of the Federal Reserve.
Monetary theorists would call this access to the lender of last
resort. Second, unlike corporations of the garden variety,
banks have liabilities called deposits that are insured by an
agency of the U.S.government,namely,the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.Deposit insurance enables banks to
have a lower funding cost than nonbanks.
Why is it significant that banks have a privileged status in
our legal infrastructure? Because with the special privileges
come special obligations.As Comptroller Hawke suggested,
banks must take into account a stakeholder other than the
owner/shareholder. For banks, this other interest is the
“public interest.”
From these settled principles,Comptroller Hawke asked a
question that must be considered by the governing body of
any holding company.He asked,“Who speaks for the bank?”
When the bank has a stakeholder constituency that is
broader than just its holding company,the question does not
have an obvious or clear answer.
In considering corporate governance practice in the con-
text of a holding company structure, Comptroller Hawke
referred to the issue of whether a holding company should
control the management of the bank by controlling the bank’s
board of directors.The concern is that overlapping directors
would speak only for the holding company and that no one at
the bank level would speak for the public interest.In my view,
this concern makes too much of the feared conflict between
the public interest and the interest of the holding company,
and much too little of their shared goal of ensuring the safe
and sound operation of the enterprise.Let me explain.
Prudential banking laws and regulations, at
least as they relate to safety and soundness,
were designed to safeguard the government’s
interest in the bank. Sarbanes-Oxley picks
up some of those principles and employs
them to protect the stakeholders interested
in publicly traded companies, including the
company shareholders. 
Banks must take into account a stakeholder
other than the owner/shareholder. For
banks, this other interest is the “public
interest.”As I see it,the public interest in the bank subsidiary is
protected by a panoply of prudential laws and regulations.
The ownership interest of the holding company in the bank
is protected by the holding company’s ability to control the
bank’s board of directors.The ultimate owners,the share-
holders,are interested in profitability,to be sure.A prof-
itable bank may pass dividend value to its parent,and the
parent presumably will pass value to the shareholders,
either by dividend or by a higher share price.But the interests
of the shareholders and the public are reconciled because
compliance and profits will,in the majority of situations,go
hand in hand.As the ultimate owners,the shareholders will
achieve their profits only if the bank subsidiary and its par-
ent effectively manage credit,legal,reputational,operational,
and other risks.
Let’s look again at FDICIA,which I think helps prove my
point that the government interest is protected.Under the
Part 363 regulations,the audit committee of the bank sub-
sidiary is the body that considers management’s assessment
that it is complying with the laws and regulations relating to
safety and soundness.According to Part 363,this committee
is required to be independent ofboth the bank and the holding
company. So, to return to Comptroller Hawke’s question
about who in a bank speaks for the public interest, the
answer is that an independent audit committee speaks for
the public interest by having an express obligation to con-
sider compliance with laws and regulations relating to
safety and soundness.Given the audit committee’s special
functions with respect to laws and regulations relating to
safety and soundness,and in view of the audit committee’s
independence from the management of both the holding
company and the bank,there seems to be no good reason to
break that parental control.
The Job of Bank and Holding Company
Audit Committees
But how should the audit committee do its job? In terms of
focus, the committee should concentrate its oversight on
those laws and regulations that relate to safety and sound-
ness.FDICIA identifies these laws and regulations,but per-
haps the time is ripe for a reappraisal to see whether the laws
referenced are where the safety and soundness risks are cur-
rently centered.
To be effective,the audit committee must be well served
by the agents who are its eyes and ears: the bank’s auditors
and counsel,both internal and external.These key actors
must be fully engaged in and knowledgeable about the busi-
ness and affairs of the bank,or the audit committee cannot
possibly accomplish its intended purpose.In addition,the
audit and legal resources that are devoted to compliance
within the bank subsidiary must be up to the job in terms of
resources,skill level,and experience.Obviously,the demands
on the auditors and lawyers will vary with the particular
business conducted in the bank.In a large and complex bank-
ing organization,I would expect a sizable staff of well-trained
and experienced in-house auditors and attorneys.
The culture of the control group of lawyers and auditors is
also very important.These individuals need to ask,and be
asked,the question that Federal Reserve Governor Susan S.
Bies articulated in a recent speech on corporate governance:
“Are we getting by on technicalities,adhering to the letter but
not the spirit of the law?”7
Another important element of good corporate gover-
nance is the procedure the audit committee of a bank follows
when it learns that the bank has engaged in a material viola-
tion of law and regulation.Let us assume that the bank audit
committee learns of this from an auditor,counsel,or both.
The committee’s agents have identified the violation and
brought it to the attention of the responsible authority.There
are,in my view,several things that the bank audit committee
must do.First,it must properly disclose what it has learned.
It must ensure that management reveals the material viola-
tion of law and regulation to the supervisor of the bank,
because this step is required by law and regulation.8 Second,
it must ensure that management discloses the material viola-
tion either to the audit committee of the holding company or
to the holding company’s full board of directors.The reason
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for this disclosure relates to the holding company’s need to
manage and control the enterprise’s legal and reputational
risk.If the holding company does not know what is happen-
ing in the bank,then it cannot succeed in this objective.Note
that holding company control is a key factor here.If there
were no ability to control the conduct of the bank, there
would be no means for the holding company to manage risk
on an enterprise-wide basis.
The disclosure to the bank supervisor will result in a dis-
cussion about remedying the violation.Because the existence
of the violation represents a threat to the public interest,this
is no more than an appropriate safeguard.Ifthe violationis of
a law or regulation relating to safety and soundness—an
insider lending violation, for example—then the govern-
ment will likely have an immediate interest in a prompt and
effective remedy.In most cases,the interests of the bank and
the holding company will be identical.The need for remedi-
ation may be less critical in the case of other violations of
law,but these violations will still get attention from the bank
supervisor.
There is an independent reason for disclosing a material
violation of law and regulation to the bank supervisor,and
this reason relates to a systemic protection.In theory,a bank
that materially violates laws and regulations relating to
safety and soundness avoids compliance costs that are borne
by its law-abiding competitors.In the short term,these cost
savings could benefit shareholders,the ultimate owners,for
as long as the violation remains undetected.But the banking
system will function best if everyone plays by the rules.When
a violation of law is revealed,the banking system benefits,
because the punishment of the violation sends a powerful
message that the playing field is level.Ordinarily,this means
that the violator pays a penalty that will exceed the savings
realized from noncompliance or,in plain language,cheating.
In this year’s William Taylor Memorial Lecture,William J.
McDonough,President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York,described the supervisor’s role as “ensur[ing] that mar-
kets operate in a fair,transparent,and efficient manner,and
that participants comply with the rules of the game.”9
What’s Good for the Bank Is Good
for the Holding Company
Let us pursue our example of a material legal violation in a
bank—a violation that has been disclosed by the audit com-
mittee of the bank to both the bank supervisor and to the
audit committee of the holding company.At this stage,the
holding company will in most cases have powerful incentives
to remedy the material violation within the bank.
First,a reputational risk to the bank will almost certainly
pose a reputational risk to the holding company.Banks are
expected to turn square corners because they are special.
When a material legal violation by a bank becomes public,
investors tend to draw the inference that if something is rot-
ten in the bank then things must be even fouler elsewhere in
the conglomerate.Bank supervisors are known to be scruti-
nizing the bank,so there is a rational basis for this market
inference.Thus,the market exacts a very high price from a
holding company that does not mind the affairs of its bank.
Second,the holding company faces a legal risk,because it
has the ability to control the remedial steps taken by the
bank.A holding company is treated like an insured deposi-
tory institution for purposes of the enforcement jurisdiction
of the federal bank supervisors.10 Because a violation of a
remedial order occurs when an entity with control takes
action “for or toward causing,bringing about,participating
in,counseling,or aiding or abetting a violation,”11 a holding
company cannot responsibly remain quiet when notified of a
material violation in a bank.
If a cease-and-desist order is imposed on a bank that has
violated the law,and the holding company does nothing to
ensure compliance with the order’s provisions,then the hold-
ing company may itself face punitive action.12For example,in
1989, the Federal Reserve assessed a civil money penalty
against a parent holding company, the National Bank of
Greece,because it did not take supervisory action to prevent
or cure violations of law being committed by a bank sub-
sidiary,the National Mortgage Bank of Greece.13The holding
company was punished for the sins of the bank.
Third,if a holding company is also a financial holding
company,it will have a great interest in seeing that a sub-
sidiary bank is rated as “well managed”by its supervisors.If
a bank fails to correct a material legal violation promptly and
completely, then the bank’s management rating could
become less than satisfactory.14Avoiding such a downgrade
is integral to retaining financial holding company status
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
[If the audit committee identifies a legal
violation within the bank subsidiary,] the
holding company will in most cases have
powerful incentives to remedy the material
violation. Fourth, the holding company will need to inform the
Federal Reserve of the material violation in its subsidiary
bank.The Federal Reserve,for the reasons stated,would be
interested in seeing how the holding company handles the
bank’s problem.
In its role as umbrella supervisor,the Federal Reserve will
assess how well the organization manages and controls the
risk that the enterprise faces from a material violation of law
in an insured depository institution subsidiary.In all likeli-
hood,the Federal Reserve and the supervisor of the bank
(assuming it is not the Federal Reserve) will meet together
and exchange views on how the problem should be resolved.
Thus,in my experience,the holding company will not be
resistant to correcting a material law violation in a bank.
Rational self-interest will prevail.The safe and sound operation
of a bank is typically a goal shared by the board of directors
of the bank,its bank supervisor,the board of directors of its
parent holding company,and the Federal Reserve.This unity
of interest is a source of strength,not a point of weakness.
Rarely would a conflict arise among these interested groups.
Some Practical Advice
Before leaving the topic of holding company governance,let
me offer some practical recommendations on managing the
legal risks to the enterprise arising from any subsidiary,
bank or nonbank. Today, many decisions about the legal
entity for booking a particular activity are made with an eye
on the applicable law.On numerous occasions,I have heard
members of my profession trumpet that they advise clients
to book activity in a particular jurisdiction to avoid what are
loosely characterized as “burdensome”laws and regulations.
In some cases,I would not dispute the claim that the avoided
law and regulation is burdensome.In most cases,however,
the law and regulation that is avoided is prudential law and
regulation.
What that means for those of you who are involved in or
responsible for centralized risk management is that your job
becomes harder.It is harder because your organizations have
avoided a short-term cost—the cost of compliance with a
stricter regulatory regime.It is a matter of time before you
learn whether the short-term savings are worth the long-
term price.For some banks or holding companies that book
business in offshore jurisdictions (not Puerto Rico),perhaps
in special-purpose entities established in those jurisdic-
tions,the price of avoiding prudential measures may ulti-
mately far exceed the savings.
So what should you do now as a matter of good gover-
nance? I suggest that you look closely at the legal entities
where your enterprise is booking business.If you see book-
ings in legal entities domiciled in locations where prudential
law and regulation is weak,then perhaps you might wish to
ask some follow-up questions.The essence of effective risk
management in the holding company is identifying your
risks and then taking affirmative action to keep those risks
within manageable limits.
Conclusion
Let me conclude with some general principles that I believe
should animate the governance of a holding company.
First,given my view that risk management is a core func-
tion of the holding company, the parent audit committee
should oversee how risks are identified and managed across
the enterprise.With a bank, the parent holding company
needs to pay especially close attention to how the bank’s
audit committee oversees legal and compliance risk.
Second,the audit committee of the bank has a distinctive
role with respect to laws and regulations that relate to safety
and soundness.This role derives from the bank’s special sta-
tus under federal law and the need to protect the public
interest.When there exist material violations of safety and
soundness laws,the audit committee needs to make prompt
disclosure to the bank supervisor and to the holding com-
pany,or to the holding company’s audit committee.It also
needs to fashion a remedy,and to work with the other inter-
ested parties—its supervisor,the holding company,and the
Federal Reserve—to see that the remedy is acceptable and
effective.
Third, when the governance of the holding company
works as it should,all of the interested stakeholders become
aligned.The umbrella supervisor,the holding company,the
bank,and the bank supervisor should work toward the same
goal:the safe and sound operation of the enterprise.Holding
company control is one salutary structural feature that
should remain.
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typically a goal shared by the board of
directors of the bank, its bank supervisor,
the board of directors of its parent holding
company, and the Federal Reserve. To close,let me say that I am confident that the regrettable
events of the last year will spur our collective efforts to
achieve better governance,and that these efforts will pay a
dividend as financial conglomerates operate ever more
safely and soundly.The entire legal infrastructure is already
in place.All we need to do is make it work.
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